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BETWEEN NATIONAL AND POST-NATIONAL: MEMBERSHIP
IN THE UNITED STATES
T. Alexander Aleinikoff*
This essay argues that the concept of post-nationalism does not precisely
explain the American concept of citizenship. This is due to the strict
construction of the nation state in American constitutional theory, the
ineffective role of international human rights norms in American
jurisprudence, and the extension of protection to non-citizens based on
territorialist rationales. For these reasons, the author suggests that
denizenship is a more appropriate way of viewing the American
citizenship model, and is one that explains how notions of personal
identity can be transnational while still justifiable within traditional
nation-state constructs.
It has become fashionable to predict the decline of the nation-
state at the hands of sub-national and supra-national forces. Ethnic
minorities, transnational corporations, international organizations
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are rounded up as
the usual destabilizing suspects. Increasingly, a new group is said to
contribute to the weakening of the nation-state regime: trans-border
migrants. Their movement-creates and maintains "transnational"
communities that put pressure on the idea of loyalty to a single state.
They may also form alliances with domestic minority groups who
are demanding greater recognition-or autonomy-from the na-
tional government.
Migrants disturb national boundaries in another sense: they
complicate notions of national membership. Settled immigrants
(sometimes even unlawful immigrants) may make claims to some
forms of "membership" rights, such as entitlements to national
benefit programs and educational opportunities, protection under
non-discrimination laws, and due process rights in deportation
proceedings. These claims are generally put in domestic law terms;
where possible, immigrants are likely to try to fit their claims within
rights established by national constitutions and legislation. But in-
creasingly, immigrants are invoking international legal norms that
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This paper was pre-
pared for a conference on Integrating Immigrants in Liberal States, sponsored by the
European Forum of the Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University
Institute, May 8-9, 1998. I would like to thank Rainer Baubock Linda Bosniak, Peter
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protect "persons" (not just "citizens") as they assert claims to fair
treatment and basic rights.
The recognition of moral and legal rights whose source is out-
side the nation-state but which are applicable within (or against the
nation-state) has been termed an aspect of "post-national" member-
ship. In an important work, Yasemin NuhoAlu Soysal has examined
post-national membership in Europe.! That continent may be the
most fruitful location for such an inquiry: Europe has witnessed
large-scale immigration in recent decades, and most of the states
recognize the authority of the European Court of Human Rights to
render decisions binding on national governments that are parties to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
2Fundamental Freedoms. In this essay, I will consider the extent to
which a "post-national perspective" may be applicable to concepts of
membership and sovereignty in the United States. By "post-national
perspective" I mean the claim that "national citizenship is losing
ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in deter-
ritorialized notions of persons' rights., 3 The post-national perspective
centers around the following claims:
(1) rights and privileges once reserved for citizens (the
"national perspective") are now recognized on the ba-
sis of personhood;
(2) migration has been a motivating factor in this recon-
ceptualization of rights (placing non-members in a
position to assert newly defined membership claims);
(3) these rights claims find their source beyond the na-
tion-state in international human rights norms and
structures;
(4) the result is "deterritorialized" membership;
(5) the basis of state legitimacy is shifting from notions of
(national) popular will to its respect for international
4human rights norms.
1. See YASEMIN NUHOOLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CIrIzENS-IP: MIGRANTS AND
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); see also DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS
ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CmzENSHIP 2-3 (1996)
(explaining the shift from state sovereignty to international human rights).
2. Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
3. SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See JACOBSON, supra note 1, at 2-3:
In the Euro-Atlantic core of the world order, in North America and
Western Europe, the basis of state legitimacy is shifting from princi-
ples of sovereignty and national self-determination to international
human rights. Increasingly, territorially delimited nations are not the
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Together, these descriptions are understood to support a progressive
narrative of the expansion of human rights to previously marginal-
ized groups.
The post-national perspective has implications at the personal
level as well. Traditionally, individuals have seen themselves
primarily as members of one polity; but today, migration and the
assertion of non-state-based rights are producing transnational or
supra-national identities. Thus, we are said to be witnessing "the
emergence of membership that is multiple in the sense of spanning
local, regional, and global identities, and which accommodates
intersecting complexes of rights, duties and loyalties.,5 Deter-
ritorialized identities are usually seen as liberating-creating
opportunities for new connections and communities, and
establishing universal norms of just treatment.
I will argue that the post-national perspective is not an accu-
rate depiction of U.S. models of rights and membership. To some
degree there is an overlap between post-national models and the
American tradition: rights and privileges have been extended to
resident non-nationals in the United States. But the recognition of
rights for non-nationals has not been based on norms that tran-
scend the nation-state; rather, it is a core attribute of American
constitutionalism, deeply embedded in the idea of the American
state. International human rights norms play a surprisingly small
role in U.S. discourse and jurisprudence. The post-national claim is
correct to see migration as the wedge for the assertion of such rights,
but such human rights discourses have had little traction in the
United States. Finally, U.S. models of membership that extend rights
to non-citizens are largely territorialized, making "denizenship 6 a
more accurate rendering of the American structure of rights than
post-nationalism. I will conclude with some comments on post-
nationalism at the personal level-suggesting that while personal
identities are becoming more transnational, such multiplicity is
only carriers of "universal humanity." All residents, noncitizens as
well as citizens, can claim their human rights. In this process the state
is becoming less constituted by "the people" while becoming in-
creasingly constituted by international human rights codes and
institutions. The state is becoming less a sovereign agent and more an
institutional forum for a larger international and constitutional order
based on human rights.
5. SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 166.
6. See TOMAS HAMMAR, DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION STATE: ALENS, DENIZENS
AND CITIZENS IN A WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 106-124 (1990); see also
RAINER BAUBOCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 65 (1994) (arguing that "denizenship" derives from an
implicit contract, not simply subjection to a state's laws).
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articulated primarily in the context of the nation-state (giving rise to
an "inter-nationality" more than a post-nationality).
I. SOURCES OF RIGHTS AND CLASSES OF BENEFICIARIES:
THE BREARD CASE AND BEYOND
On April 14, 1998, the State of Virginia executed by lethal injec-
tion Angel Francisco Breard, a 32 year-old citizen of Paraguay who
had been residing in Virginia for 12 years. In 1992, Breard had been
convicted of a brutal murder, stabbing his victim five times in the
neck during a sexual assault. He testified at his trial that he had
killed his victim because he had been under the influence of a sa-
tanic curse.
Imposition of the death penalty raises significant human rights
issues. The United States is virtually alone among Western states in
its preservation of the death penalty. A decade ago, the European
Court of Human Rights held that it would be a violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights for the United Kingdom to
extradite a West German citizen to stand trial in Virginia in a capital
case.7 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions called for a moratorium on the use of the death
penalty in the United States following an investigative visit in 1997.8
And Amnesty International, in a 1998 report on human rights abuses
in the United States, singled out the death penalty for particularly
harsh criticism.' But Breard's appeal of his conviction and sentence
7. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (holding that
long wait and uncertainty of punishment on death row violates European Conven-
tion on Human Rights' prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment); see also The Netherlands: Opinion of the Advocaat-General and Supreme
Court Decision in The Netherlands v. Short, 29 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1375 (1990)
(denying United States' extradition request of an American serviceman who killed
his wife in the Netherlands to prevent defendant's possible exposure to death pen-
alty). For a discussion of human rights and extradition, see John Dugard & Christine
Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187
(1998).
8. See Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur, 1 148, U.D. Doc. E/CN.4/68/
1998/Add.3., 22 Jan. 1998, cited in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA RIGHTS FOR ALL 120 (1998) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL]; see also
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40 9191 266-304, U.N. A/50/40
(1995) (deploring the expansion of the death penalty at the federal level and its
continued prevalence at the state level).
9. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 8, at 99 ("International human
rights standards seek to restrict the scope of the death penalty. They forbid its use
against juvenile offenders, see it as an unacceptable punishment for the mentally
impaired, and demand the highest legal safeguards for all capital trials. The USA
fails to meet these minimum standards on all counts.").
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did not assert a violation of international human rights norms. The
American death penalty appears immune to such challenges.'0
Breard did, however, eventually make a claim based on interna-
tional law. In 1996, his lawyers filed a habeas corpus action in federal
court asserting that his rights under the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations had been violated because he had not been informed
of his right to contact a consular officer of Paraguay after his arrest
and detention." His argument was that consular officials might have
urged him to accept a plea agreement, under which he could have
received a life sentence, rather than go to trial and risk receiving a
death sentence.
The federal courts rejected this claim, saying that he had
waived his right to raise it during his appeal in state court. Mean-
while, Paraguay brought its own action against Virginia in federal
court based on the Vienna Convention. It asked the court to return
the situation to the status quo ante-that is, to nullify the conviction
and the sentence. The lower courts held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment prohibited a foreign country from suing a state in federal
court.1
2
Following its loss in the lower court and receiving no help from
the State Department in getting Virginia to change its decision
(although the Department conceded that the treaty had been
10. See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (rejecting argument
of dissenting opinion that practices of other nations and provisions in human rights
treaties condemning juvenile death penalties are relevant in determining constitu-
tionality of death penalty for a 17 year-old).
For a case in which such a claim was raised-and failed, see State v. Steffen,
No. C-930351, 1994 WL 176906, *4, *10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 1994). There the court
stated:
In his fourth claim for relief, Steffen contended that his convictions
and sentences were void or voidable because the Ohio death penalty
is in violation of international law. Specifically, Steffen cited Articles
1, 2, 18, 25 and 26 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man, to which the United States is a signatory. We have
reviewed the various provisions of the American Declaration to
which Steffen referred and find that the record does not demonstrate
their violation. We note, moreover, that Steffen has presented abso-
lutely no evidence and made no colorable argument supported by
precedent from any human rights forum that his arrest, incarceration,
trial and sentence violated international human rights norms to
which the United States is bound either by customary international
law, i.e., rights having acquired the status of jus cogens, or treaty.
The trial court's dismissal of Steffen's fourth claim for relief was
thus appropriate.
Id. at *4.
11. See Breard v. Greene, 528 U.S. 371 (1998); Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
12. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
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violated), Paraguay filed an action before the International Court of
Justice on April 3, 1998. Six days later, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) issued an order stating that the United States "should
take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these1- ,,13
proceedings. The Legal Adviser to the State Department brought
the order to the attention of the Governor of Virginia, and in an
extraordinary letter, the Secretary of State personally requested the
Governor to stay the execution pending the ICJ's consideration of
the case.
14
Meanwhile, Breard and Paraguay had appealed their cases to
the U.S. Supreme Court. By the time the high court considered the
cases, the ICJ had issued its order and Breard had been scheduled to
be executed. The U.S. government, although not a party to the ac-
tions, filed a brief urging the Supreme Court to reject the appeals.
This was contemporaneous with the Secretary of State's request to
the Governor of Virginia that the execution be stayed. The U.S. gov-
ernment began its argument in the Supreme Court by noting that it
took seriously its obligations under the Vienna Convention, then
asserted that the Convention did not provide a remedy of nullifying
state criminal convictions, that consular notification would in all
likelihood not have changed the result, that Breard had waived the
claim in any event, and that the matter should be handled state-to-
state without Court intervention." The government further stated
that the Department of State had accorded Paraguay "the traditional
remedy among nations for failure of consular notification: it has
investigated the facts, determined there was a breach, formally
apologized on behalf of the United States, and undertaken to im-
prove compliance. 16 This "remedy," of course, provided little solace
to Mr. Breard.
The Supreme Court denied the appeals. In a brief opinion, it
held that Breard had defaulted his claim (assuming he had one); and
even if the claim had been timely raised, it was "extremely doubtful"
that the violation should result in overturning the conviction.
7
The Court noted that "it is unfortunate that this matter comes
before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ that might
13. See id. at 374 (quoting ICJ order of April 9, 1998).
14. See Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, to James S. Gilmore
III, Governor of Virginia (April 13, 1998) (on file with author).
15. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390 & 97-8214).
16. Id. at 13.
17. Breard, 523 U.S. at 377.
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have been brought to that court earlier."" Nonetheless, it concluded
that Breard was not entitled to a remedy from U.S. courts.
The Court duly noted Secretary Albright's letter to the
Governor of Virginia and closed by saying: "If the Governor wishes
to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing
in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him."' 9
The Governor did not wish to wait. He told the press:
As governor of Virginia, it is my first duty to ensure
that those who reside within our borders-both Ameri-
can citizens and foreign nationals-may conduct their
lives free from the fear of crime.... In this case Mr.
Breard received all of the procedural safeguards that
any American citizen would receive. [Delaying the exe-
cution] would have the practical effect of transferring
responsibility from the courts of the Commonwealth
and the United States to the International Court.20
So Breard was put to death on the day the Supreme Court is-
sued its opinion, and just five days after the IC's order requesting a
stay.
There are different ways to read this narrative pertinent to the
post-national claim. At first glance, the story is a flat denial of the
claim: here a state violated international law and then ignored an
order of the international court with the gravest of consequences-
execution of a human being. The federal government--charged with
enforcing international obligations-was left pleading with one of its
own subunits (Virginia) to respect the ICJ. The Governor of Virginia
stated that to respect international law would have been to violate
his duties to the residents of Virginia, and would have actually
given Breard more rights than those possessed by citizens of the
United States (who cannot generally seek the assistance of a foreign
sovereign in the course of a criminal proceeding). The U.S. govern-
ment's inability to command fidelity to international law and the
Governor's assertion that the legal claim based on international law
was illegitimate and discriminatory is hardly a ringing endorsement
of the post-national perspective.
But arguably there is something more here. Breard did raise a
claim in the federal courts grounded in international law; and the
United States government did not argue in the Supreme Court that
international law did not apply or had not been violated.
18. Id. at 378.
19. Id.
20. Brooke A. Masters & Joan Biskupic, Killer Executed Despite Pleas; World Tribu-
nal, State Department Had Urged Delay, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1998, at B1.
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Furthermore, the Secretary of State specifically sought to forestall
the execution on the ground that proceeding with the execution in
the face of the ICJ order could "be seen as a denial by the United
States of the significance of international law and the Court
processes., 21 These are-important concessions regarding the possible
trumping power of international law. On this view, Breard's
execution was not a failure to recognize international norms but
rather a disagreement about what remedies are available if norms
are breached.
But this more sanguine narrative merits closer scrutiny. What,
after all, was the basis of the U.S. government's position that the
Vienna Convention must be respected? According to the Secretary of
State, the government was concerned that disrespect would have
endangered U.S. citizens abroad who themselves might seek the
protection of the Convention. On this view, the international law
norm affirmed in the government's argument was not a human
rights norm (it certainly was not the claim that the death penalty as
practiced in the United States violates human rights law), but rather
a means by which sovereign states order their affairs and protect
their citizens in the pursuit of state interests.
The Breard case does not "disprove" the post-national claim. But
it is powerful testimony that rights remain nationally based and
defined, and that even those rights whose source is a "transnational
community" frequently represent national interests more than the
rights of personhood.
To say this, however, is not to accept the nationalist claim that
rights and privileges are extended only to full members (i.e., citi-
zens) of the American polity. Rather, American practice has long
extended rights and privileges to non-nationals residing in U.S.
territory. The Bill of Rights ostentatiously fails to apply its protec-
tions solely to citizens. It uses the words "person" or "the people" or
other terms not tied to citizenship, such as "the accused," to define
the beneficiaries of protection.2
The Supreme Court has regularly affirmed that most of the
Constitution's protections extend to non-citizens. 23 After a careful
21. Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, supra note 14.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ..."); id.
amend V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ..."); id. amend. VI
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right o a speedy and public
trial.. .").
23. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 915, 918-919 (1995); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
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examination of the role of citizenship in the American conception of
rights and constitutionalism, Alexander Bickel concluded:
I find it gratifying ... that we live under a Constitution
to which the concept of citizenship matters very little,
that prescribes decencies and wise modalities of gov-
ernment quite without regard to the concept of
citizenship. It subsumes important obligations and
functions of the individual which have other sources-
moral, political, and traditional-sources more complex
than the simple contractarian notion of citizenship.24
While this constitutional tradition casts a long shadow on the
nationalist claim, it does not lend support to the post-national claim
because these rights and privileges find their source in national
documents and institutions. Soysal is correct to note that
"[o]riginally individual rights were defined and codified within
schemes of national citizenship."5 But her claim that "[tioday ...
individual rights [are] expansively redefined as human rights on a
universalistic basis and legitimized at the transnational level"2 6 does
not seem applicable to the United States. The rights of non-citizens
are primarily based on direct application of the U.S. Constitution or
statutory law.
I say primarily because international law-both treaty law and
customary law-does play a role in the U.S. legal system. The Con-
stitution declares that "all Treaties made ... under the Authority of
the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land;'2 7 and fed-
eral courts stand ready to enforce treaty rights against state and
private action. But to be enforceable in court, such treaties must be
"self-executing" or Congress must adopt legislation that makes the
treaties applicable in U.S. courts. Human rights treaties are rarely
held to be self-executing, and Congress in recent years has not cho-
sen to make them enforceable in federal courts. U.S. ratification of
873 (1975) (Fourth Amendment protection for non-citizens); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (Fifth Amendment protection for non-citizens).
24. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53-54 (1975).
25. SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 164; see, e.g. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para 2 (U.S. 1776) (affirming as "self evident" the proposition that "all men are ...
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.").
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
28. See Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individ-
ual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 805, 813 (1990); see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees not self-executing); Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 620-21
SPRING 1999]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
human rights conventions has been accompanied by express decla-
rations stating (1) that the convention is not self-executing, 29 and (2)
that the United States accepts no obligations under the convention
beyond protections already afforded by U.S. constitutional and
statutory law.3° As a result, as Thomas Buergenthal has noted, "it is
becoming more and more difficult in the United States fully to trans-
form international human rights obligations into directly applicable
domestic law"-a trend that runs counter to developments in other
Western states.31
Customary international law is potentially a source of human
rights protection in domestic U.S. courts. Supreme Court decisions
in the past appeared to provide generous reception of international
32law. Nearly a century ago, the Court ruled that:
International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no
(Cal. 1952) (U.N. Charter not self-executing, therefore not binding on the court). On
the meaning of self-execution, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
29. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01; S17491 (Oct. 27, 1990) (United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
not self-executing); 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01, S4783 (International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights not self-executing).
30. See, e.g., Resolution of Ratification Regarding International Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 (une 24,
1994); Resolution of Ratification Regarding United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 136 Cong. Rec.
S17486, S17491 (Oct. 27, 1990) ("The United States considers itself bound... only
insofar as the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means
the cruel, unusual, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."). A 1993 Human Rights Watch and American Civil Liberties Union
report on U.S. compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights concluded that the U.S. declarations, reservations and understandings to the
Convention rendered ratification "an empty act for Americans: the endorsement of
the most important treaty for the protection of civil rights yielded not a single addi-
tional enforceable right to citizens and residents of the United States." HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIvIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 2 (1993), quoted in Nkechi Taifa, Codifica-
tion or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms
of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40 HOw. L.J. 641, 653 (1997).
31. Thomas Buergenthal, Modem Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 212 (1997); see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 341 (1995).
32. See generally JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1996).
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treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations .... 33
Furthermore, the Court has applied a general interpretive norm,
dating from an 1804 decision by Chief Justice Marshall, that "an act
of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations,
if any other possible construction remains. ... 34 But in modern
times courts have rarely concluded that international human rights
norms are applicable or binding as a formal legal matter, particu-
larly when they conflict with statutory law.35
Soysal and Jacobson are correct to suggest that international
human rights law claims have generally arisen in cases involving
non-nationals. In the U.S. context this is so because the Supreme
Court has not applied general constitutional norms to most immi-
gration regulation. 6 Thus, from time to time, non-citizens have
invoked international human rights protections in challenges to U.S.
immigration policies. These cases have raised claims regarding, for
example, conditions of detention 37 forcible abduction of non-citizens
outside the United States for trial in the United States,3 and refugee
protection.
But such claims have generally not received sympathetic treat-
ment by the courts. Indeed, as Jordan Paust has noted, the modern
approach of denying the applicability of customary international
law has received its strongest statement in cases involving aliens-a
development that turns the post-national claim on its head. 0 An
33. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
34. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
35. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-219 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees not self-executing). For
some rare examples in domestic areas where international human rights norms have
been held applicable, see Jama v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22
F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998) (permitting suit against INS officials based on custom-
ary international law); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980)
(finding indeterminate detention of Cuban refugee in federal prison violates Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights). The most important example is Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
36. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862 (1989).
37. See Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353; Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. 787.
38. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
39. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); see also United
Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (claiming that the murder
conviction of Mexican national violated Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
Bilateral Consular Convention, and International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights).
40. See Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law in the United States: Clean and
Dirty Laundry, 40 GERMAN YRBK. OF INT'L L. 78 (1998); see also Joan Fitzpatrick &
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example is a case involving Cuban nationals in the United States
who had been convicted of criminal offenses and whom the United
States sought to deport to Cuba at the end of their terms of incar-
ceration. Cuba would not accept their return, so they spent a number
of years in Immigration and Naturalization Service detention. The
Cuban nationals claimed that their long-term detention by the INS
violated customary international human rights law. But a federal
court of appeals rejected the claim, agreeing with several other
courts of appeals that had ruled in similar circumstances that
"international law is not controlling because federal executive, leg-
islative, and judicial actions supersede the application of these
principles of international law."4'
A notable exception to the argument that international human
rights norms are of limited utility in U.S. courts involves claims
brought under the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA).42 This statute, en-
acted in 1789, grants federal district courts jurisdiction to hear civil
cases brought by an alien for "a tort... committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 43 The statute lay
dormant for almost two centuries until the watershed case of Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala.44 In that case, Dr. Filartiga and his daughter
(citizens of Paraguay living in the United States) brought a damage
action against Pena-Irala, who had been Inspector General of Police
in Asuncion, Paraguay and was then present in the United States.
The Filartigas alleged that the police had kidnapped and tortured to
death Filartiga's seventeen year-old son in retaliation for Filartiga's
political activities. The court held that the "law of nations" in-
cludes customary international law and that official torture, under
modern standards, violates customary international law. Thus the
court permitted the case to proceed, concluding that "[o]ur holding
William M. Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of International Law on the Immi-
gration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589, 627 (1995) ("It is profoundly
disturbing that contemporary U.S. immigration policy, in a number of respects, falls
short of international standards. Even more troubling is the absence of international
law as a relevant factor in immigration policy discourse.").
41. Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447-48, amended, 997
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1993); see Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding customary international law regarding safe haven inapplicable in proceed-
ing before U.S. immigration authorities, given comprehensive federal scheme of
regulation).
For a lower court case willing to consider international law in immigration
proceedings, see Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-80 (E.D. La. 1996),
which interpreted constitutional norms in light of customary international law and
human rights treaties, condemning arbitrary detention of aliens.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
43. Id.
44. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our
First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the• • ,,45
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.
Filartiga was viewed by many scholars as a breakthrough in the
application of human rights norms in domestic cases.46 But these
extravagant hopes have gone largely unfulfilled.47 Courts have been
hesitant to declare most international human rights part of an en-
forceable customary international law.4 More importantly, it is not
obvious how the Filartiga case advances the post-national claim. The
case involved a suit by a non-citizen against a non-citizen for events
that happened outside the United States. The fact that a federal court
permitted the lawsuit to proceed says little about the basis of legiti-
macy of the American state vis-a-vis its treatment of residents of its
territory.
In sum, non-citizens enjoy a wide array of constitutional and
statutory rights in the United States that are frequently asserted in
U.S. courts. But international human rights law plays, at best, a lim-
ited role in the protection of the rights of persons-aliens or
citizens-in the United States.
The controversy surrounding California's Proposition 187
nicely illustrates the point. Frustrated by years of lax federal en-
forcement, concerned about rising welfare and education costs, and
worried about the race and ethnicity of immigrants, the people of
California adopted Proposition 187 on November 9, 1994, with the
intent of deterring the entry and residence of undocumented aliens
45. Id. at 890.
46. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domes-
tic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L.REV. 367 397-402 (1985).
47. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 822 ("Despite some predictions that Filartiga
heralded a trend toward wholesale domestic incorporation of customary interna-
tional human rights law, that development has not yet materialized.") (footnotes
omitted). For a case recognizing an ATCA claim, see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (brought
by victims and families of victims of torture, summary execution, and disappear-
ances in the Philippines).
48. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (rejecting amicus argument that continued detention of
Haitian plaintiffs constituted arbitrary and indefinite punishment); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795-796 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)
(rejecting cause of action based on international common law brought by survivors
of a bus attack by the PLO). In an important development, a district court has per-
mitted a case to proceed under the ATCA brought by alien detainees against INS
officials for cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. See Jama v. United States
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D.N.J. 1998). The court
dismissed a claim against the INS on grounds of sovereign immunity, but let the case
go ahead against individual INS officers. The case is significant because it is a use of
the ATCA against the federal government, not a foreign official. It remains to be seen
whether it will survive on appeal.
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in the state. Proposition 187 barred undocumented migrants from
public schools (in direct contravention of a Supreme Court decision49),
prohibited them from receiving most forms of social welfare, and
mandated that state law enforcement officers, teachers, doctors, and
other social workers notify the INS if they believed a person was in the
United States illegally. Opponents strenuously objected to nativist and
racist statements made in support of Proposition 187i0 Some immi-
grant groups and religious organizations argued that the measure
violated notions of human dignity and constituted unjust treatment of
undocumented migrants. But this was not a position pressed by most
of the opponents.5' And in the ensuing litigation challenging Proposi-
tion 187, human rights talk was nowhere to be found. Rather, the
lawyers appealed to traditional constitutional grounds of equal pro-
tection and federal preemption and persuaded a court to issue an
injunction preventing the proposition's implementation.52
One answer to the argument made in this section is that by fo-
cusing on the enforceability of legal norms, I have missed the
discursive power of human rights claims to spark political action
and change government conduct.5 Harold Koh, reports these kinds
49. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Texas statute authorizing local school
districts to bar resident undocumented children from public schools violated the
Equal Protection Clause).
50. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 629, 650-58 (1995) (discussing the campaigns for and against the initiative).
51. See Linda Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the
National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REv. 555,567-569 (1996).
52. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995); see also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.
Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding Congress's Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act preempted portions of Proposition 187).
For a counterexample consistent with Soysal's thesis, consider the recent filing
of a complaint by the ACLU and the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation
before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, asserting that INS border
enforcement activities violate the Charter of the Organization of American States and
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See PETITION TO THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ORG. OF AM. STATES 4, Feb. 9.
1999 (on file with author).
53. The fact that a treaty is not self-executing means primarily that it is not
enforceable in courts. Under international law, a duly ratified treaty is binding on the
executive branch. Thus, before Congress enacted the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, § 2242, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,
slip law at 822 (1999), executing the Torture Convention, the Department of Justice
had recognized that it was bound by the Convention's provisions prohibiting return
of a person to a country where he or she is likely to be tortured. See 62 Fed. Reg.
10,312, 10,316 (1997); Office of Gen. Counsel Memo, May 14, 1997, reprinted in 75
nterp. Rel. 375 (Mar. 16, 1998).
54. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights
Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994).
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of results in his discussion of the Alvarez-Machain5s case. In that case,
the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-Machain's forced abduction
from Mexican territory by U.S. agents did not violate the U.S.-
Mexican extradition treaty and therefore did not divest U.S. courts
of jurisdiction to try him. The decision prompted severe criticism,
triggering congressional hearings, a Department of Justice review of
procedures, and OAS and UN opinions that the conduct violated
international law. Alvarez-Machain was acquitted of the criminal
charges, and thereafter filed a civil suit against the federal officers
who had kidnapped him.5 Eventually, the U.S. and Mexico reached
an agreement to amend their extradition treaty to prohibit trans-
border kidnapping.
Other examples of NGO reports, press conferences, and public
demonstrations abound. Of particular note is the release of an Am-
nesty International report in October 1998 on human rights abuses in
the United States. 8 The Amnesty report does not simply focus on
treatment of non-citizens (although it devotes more than a few pages
to those issues). It condemns police brutality, prison conditions, and
operation of the death penalty as violations of the human rights of
American citizens.59
While these examples are well-known and significant in terms
of shaping public perceptions and, sometimes, government conduct,
they are still far from proving the post-national claim that the le-
gitimacy of the state is now conceived of in terms of its respect for
international human rights. Perhaps the Breard case shows that the
federal government takes seriously its international law obligations,
even if it was unable to persuade the governor of Virginia to take
seriously an order from the International Court of Justice. But re-
spect for international law is not the same as a shift in the basis of
state legitimacy. Indeed, if anything, Breard appears to demonstrate
the dominance of nationally-based legal norms (which, as have been
described, include protections for aliens) over international stan-
dards and processes.
55. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
56. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing
to dismiss claims under Federal Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection
Act).
57. See Koh, supra note 54, at 2405-06.
58. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 8 (1998).
59. See id.
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II. THE CLAIM OF DETERRITORIALIZED MEMBERSHIP
In the preceding section, I have suggested that non-citizens
receive significant rights protections based on domestic legal
sources. These protections apply to all aliens present in the United
States.60 Furthermore, permanent resident aliens ("greencard
holders") are generally protected by federal and state labor and
health laws and are eligible for a wide array of social programs in
the United States (although they were excluded from means-tested
programs by the 1996 immigration legislation, described below).
Thus, the membership rights of aliens under U.S. law are largely
territorially-based.61 This is surely a broader conception of rights than
the citizens-only view of the nationalist model, but it does not fit
easily with the "deterritorialized" membership claims of the post-
national perspective.
As Soysal notes, Tomas Hammar and others have referred to
this territorially based membership model for settled immigrants as
"denizenship."62 But she suggests that this concept, which "remain[s]
within the confines of the nation-state model," is an inadequate de-
scription:
[T]he incorporation of guestworkers is no mere expan-
sion of the scope of national citizenship, nor is it an
irregularity. Rather, it reveals a profound transformation
in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional
logic and the way it is legitimated. To locate the
changes, we need to go beyond the nation-state.63
Again, from the national perspective, it is true that extension of
rights to non-citizens represents a fundamental shift in approach.
But the "incorporation" of immigrants in terms of membership
rights has been and continues to be the rule-the logic, if you will-
of the American membership system. At least since the adoption of
60. See United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing aliens'
privilege against self-incrimination); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 52-71 (1996)
(discussing the rights of aliens in the United States).
61. Perhaps the high-water mark of protection of resident aliens is Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982). See supra note 49.
62. SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 138-39; see HAMMAR, supra note 6, at 735-47; William
R. Brubaker, Membership without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Nonciti-
zens, in IMMIGRATION AND POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
145 (William R. Brubaker ed., 1989); see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, BETWEEN
PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS: THE DIRECTIONS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP POLICY (1999)
(describing "lawful-settlement-as-membership model"); Baubbck, supra note 6, at 65.
63. SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 139.
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the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, immigrants have been
protected by the Constitution and federal laws against unfriendly
state regulation. And the welfare state established in the twentieth
century had generally been understood to benefit lawful immigrants
as well as citizens.64 (That understanding was seriously challenged
by the round of anti-immigrant legislation enacted in the mid-1990s.
But that legislation, disentitling lawful immigrants from most
means-tested social programs, shows that if any movement is taking
place in United States membership models, it is a drift more towards
the nationalist model than towards the post-national model.)
65
Soysal recognizes that politics in Western states in the 1990s
seem to run counter to the post-national claim.6 She argues that:
[tlhese seemingly paradoxical affinities articulate an
underlying dialectic of the postwar global system:
While nation-states and their boundaries are reified
through assertions of border controls and appeals to na-
tionhood, a new mode of membership, anchored in the
universalistic rights of personhood, transgresses the na-
tional order of. things.67
She further notes that the "national order of things" is also
destabilized by sub-national groups asserting "nationhood." To-
gether, these "recontextualizations of 'nationness' within .the
universalistic discourse of human rights" are said to "blur the
meanings and boundaries attached to the nation and the nation-
state. '"8
There is much to this description. The boundaries of nation and
nation-state are blurring to some degree, and the reassertion of ag-
gressive nationalism may well, in part, be a response to challenges to
the state from above and below, an increase in dual nationality, and
diasporic politics activated by governments of "sending" countries.
But it is difficult to describe developments in the United States as a
reaction to the pressure of human rights discourse. Rather, the con-
troversy in the United States plays out largely in terms of
multiculturalism and assimilationism, fractionalization and unity.
This is a fight that goes on primarily among native (citizen)
groups, although immigration is commonly alleged to contribute
64. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that a state's restric-
tion on eligibility of legal aliens for public assistance violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
65. See Aleinikoff, Tightening Circle of Membership, supra note 23.
66. See SOYSAL, supra note 1, at 156.
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id. at 162.
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to the "balkanization" of America. Thus right-wing politics stresses
a revaluation of citizenship as a way to command assimilation to a
common (read: Anglo/White) culture, and seeks to redefine the
American model of membership from denizenship to citizenship.
Notions of personhood play a role in the resistance to such a move;
but it is a personhood rooted in and protected by constitutional




The blurring of borders may occur at the individual as well as the
state level, producing a sort of post-modem malaise of unrootedness
and "ambiguously identified" persons.70 "In immigrant societies,"
Michael Walzer writes, "people have begun to experience what we
might think of as a life without clear boundaries and without secure
or singular identities., 71 Frequent movement across borders or the
existence of communities experiencing a continuous flow of new-
comers may challenge the creation of stable, rooted associations.
Individuals may end up living in what is in effect a transnational
community, straddling two worlds but at home in neither; or they
may find no community at all, being simply the sum of their own
particularistic circumstances, attachments and proclivities.
Do these bleak depictions accurately capture the (admittedly
complicated) nature of modern identities? It is certainly true that
many of us have multiple attachments and some of these attach-
ments cross national borders. It is not obvious, however, that this
state of affairs produces anomie or a post-modem neurosis. On the
contrary, it appears that human beings are rather adept at living in
more than one world, bringing the insights of one to bear on an-
other, or compartmentalizing their lives into separate spheres. Let
me give an example.
About a year ago, friends of mine traveled to Russia to adopt a
Russian baby in an orphanage. They brought the baby home, and
soon thereafter had a ceremony in their home. It was a double
ceremony, commemorating her entry into two communities: mem-
bership in the Jewish people and citizenship in the United States.
69. But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that widespread prohibition of execution of juveniles in other
nations shows contemporary attitudes towards capital punishment that should
influence interpretation of prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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The first ceremony (brit habat)'was presided over by a rabbi, who
noted that in recent years Jewish parents of daughters felt the need
for a ceremony similar to the traditional brit milah (ritual circumci-
sion) accorded Jewish boys. Brit translates as "covenant"; the
ceremony signifies entry into the Jewish community and the taking
on of the responsibilities that that entails. So the baby was blessed
and given a Jewish name-the name of a number of ancestors of the
parents, some of whom had come to the United States from Russia
several generations before.
Then a second ceremony began. The U.S. Commissioner for
Immigration, a friend of the parents, performed a naturalization
ceremony, making the baby a citizen of the United States. The
Commissioner said to the baby: "the naturalization oath is like
making a promise, a promise to be loyal to this country and obey her
laws. In return, America promises to welcome you as an equal
member of the whole family of American citizens who enjoy the
freedoms, rights, privileges and protections of the Constitution and
the laws of this great land." The baby was asked to raise her right
hand and repeat the following words (she clasped a tiny American
flag in her left) as her parents recited the oath for her: "I will love
and be true to the United States; I will support its Constitution; obey
its laws; respect its flag; and defend it against all enemies."
Here were two ceremonies, two covenants, two different kinds
of extended family created at the same time. The example, I think,
shows that the opposite of a single, fixed identity is not necessarily a
loss of bearings or radical personal confusion. The two identities-
Jew and U.S. citizen-are deeply significant to their relevant com-
munities; but the assembled family and friends did not see a
contradiction (or even a tension) between them. Rather, there was a
sense of double rootedness, a sense of the strengthening of individ-
ual identity by making it "thicker."
IV. THE FUTURE?
The future is likely to look like the present, only more so. Im-
migration to the United States is likely to remain at or around record
levels; cross-border ties among immigrant and ethnic groups will
continue to flourish; the number of dual citizens will continue to
increase; foreign states will increasingly seek to influence or respond
to their diasporas present in the United States. Immigration will
have a significant impact on U.S. demographics, pushing Hispanics
ahead of African Americans as the largest minority group in the near
future and more than doubling the Asian American population over
the next half century.
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These trends may appear troubling to some, portending a
further weakening of U.S. sovereignty and an undermining of a
cohesive citizenship. But I think the nation-state (at least the
American nation-state) is not at risk. Rather than witnessing the
dawning of a post-national era, we are more likely to see the growth
of what I will term "inter-nationalism." By this I mean a thickening
of relations between domestic and foreign populations (through
immigration, dual nationality, freer trade and travel, the communi-
cations revolution) that will occur within the regime of nation-states.
States will remain the primary locus of law-including international
law, which will be enforced through national legal organs.
72
My concept of inter-nationalism is drawn from Anne-Marie
Slaughter's theory of "transgovernmentalism." 73 She contrasts trans-
governmentalism with the models of liberal internationalists (who
see the rise of world government, with centralized rulemaking, hier-
archical authority, universal membership) and, to use her term, the
"new medievalists" (who see an end of the nation-state, stressing the
rise of supra-, sub- and non-state actors). Slaughter's transgovern-
mentalism recognizes the continuing primacy of states, but sees
states as "disaggregating into [their] separate, functionally distinct
parts"--courts, regulatory agencies, executive departments-that
"network[] with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of
relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order."74
Inter-nationalism points to similar cross-border relations on the
personal level.75 The resulting "dense web of [human] relations" is
likely to have important implications for states, some welcome and
others not. On the positive side, such ties may foster trade and
commerce, may support diversity in the arts, cuisine and ideas, may
reduce international tensions by increasing contact and under-
standing. Inter-nationalism is also likely to give strength to claims
for recognizing the rights of immigrants, as insider/outsider lines
72. As Rainer Baub6ck has suggested to me, this statement should be qualified in
the case of Europe where the European Court of Human Rights has some authority
to enforce international human rights norms against national governments.
73. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1997, at 183, 184 (criticizing traditional versions of a new world order in favor of
a transgovernmental vision). I want to thank Catherine Gwin for calling my attention
to Slaughter's insightful article.
74. Id. at 184.
75. I am not suggesting an analogy between inter-state relations and inter-
nationalism as experienced on a personal level. But I am noting parallel develop-
ments here: As a state thickens ties with another state by creating bonds between
constituent parts, it is not giving up sovereignty to an international regime. On the
contrary, such ties may reinforce each state's "stateness." So too an individual or
groups may have ties to two states that affirm membership in each and do not neces-
sarily forge a new transnational identity or community.
[VOL. 4:241
Between National and Post-National
become less clear and states come to recognize that they are both
senders and receivers of immigrants.76
Less helpfully, a thickening of ties among cross-border popula-
tions can create tensions between states. For example, states may be
concerned about dual citizens voting in two countries, or they may
seek to act to protect the interests of their nationals residing in other
states. Resolving such issues will require state-to-state negotiation
and coordination, and perhaps the establishment of international
norms and new supra-national arrangements.
While international human rights may play a significant role in
these developments-fostering both domestic and international
rights talk-there is little reason to believe that the traditional basis
for state legitimacy is, or will be, shifting. Neither transgovernmen-
talism at the state level nor inter-nationalism at the personal level
suggests the need for new models of legitimacy or membership.
Governmental powers and individual rights may continue to be
articulated within a national structure, even as those structures
adapt to thicker cross-national relations.
Inter-nationalism is likely to produce two policy strategies in
the United States. Those on the right will increase their demands
that immigrants "go national"; thus, they will push an anti-
multicultural, anti-bilingual education agenda and perhaps seek to
stem increases in levels of dual nationality. Those on the left will
urge new incorporation programs, such as English and job training,
and will support stronger antidiscrimination measures. Ethnic
communities in the United States are likely to push for greater rights
for co-ethnic immigrant populations here. Importantly, none of these
strategies represents a "national" or "post-national" model. The basis
of individual rights-which will continue to extend to resident ali-
ens-will be presence in U.S. territory, and the definition of those
rights will be found in domestic legal documents.
On the personal level, individuals will not see themselves as
citizens of the world or as citizens of only their own solipsistic private
domains, although they may well affirm ties to several communities
(including, perhaps, more than one national community). Inter-
nationalism means that these relationships will be structured within
the regime of states, and indeed such relationships may put pressure
on that regime to be more open to plurality and movement across
borders. To return to the conversion/naturalization narrative, it
appears that dual, overlapping memberships are possible and can be
mutually supporting. Thus, there is nothing inevitable about either
the hopelessness of postmodernism or the out-of-state experience of
post-nationality. Put another way, to be bilingual is neither to speak
76. See Baubock, supra note 6, at 65.
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Esparanto nor a private language that no one else can understand.
The future may not be a post-national world, but it will be a rich
one, full of interesting and complicated relations in which the
legitimacy of the American state will be based primarily on its
dedication to democratic principles and its respect for U.S.
constitutional rights and values.
